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The lack of a supranational legal authority that can enforce private contracts across
borders makes debt repayment in an international setting contingent on borrowers’
willingness to pay rather than ability to pay. This market failure (i.e., inadequate
enforcement) causes investment to fall short of its unconstrained level. This paper
examines how foreign aid affects a country’s willingness to honor private investment
agreements. We consider two types of aid: technical assistance and loan subsidies. We
show that when enforcement is inadequate, aid has the following effects: (i) it reduces
default risk, promotes capital flows, and can, in principle, restore investment to its
unconstrained level; (ii) when default risk is high, aid can increase the welfare of both the
recipient and the donor country. Thus, foreign aid serves as an enforcement mechanism in
an international setting. This provides a nonaltruistic rationale for foreign aid. Finally, we
discuss the implications of providing bilateral versus multilateral aid (e.g., by individual
countries versus multilateral organizations).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Private capital flows to developing countries have grown significantly, increasing
from $43 billion in 1990 to $239 billion in 1999. As a consequence, some policy
makers have called for a reduction in developmental lending—that is, subsidized
loans from bilateral and multilateral agencies to developing countries.1 Others
taking a more radical stand have called for the abolition of multilateral orga-
nizations such as the World Bank, arguing that “the market” will direct capi-
tal flows appropriately. This argument is not new. According to Rodrik (1995),
John McCloy, the World Bank’s second president, believed that the Bank “would go
out of business in due course because the long-term capital needed for development
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would eventually be provided by private investors.” We analyze the role of foreign
aid when enforcement of contracts is inadequate and underinvestment occurs as
a result of this market failure. We consider two types of foreign aid—subsidized
loans and technical assistance—and show that when enforcement is inadequate,
these programs can mitigate the underinvestment problem and therefore provide a
rationale for developmental assistance in conjunction with private markets.
One of the crucial problems pertaining to international lending is the lack of a
supranational legal authority that can enforce private contracts across borders. As a
result, foreign capital is subject to endogenous expropriation risk: Borrowers may
simply choose not to repay their debt.2 In a seminal paper, Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) showed that underinvestment results. Because an effective supranational
judicial system with the authority to enforce contracts is unlikely, we consider
policy interventions that mitigate the underinvestment problem. As is standard in
the literature, a country is cut off from future credit transactions if it defaults on
a loan. When agents discount the future highly, even this severe punishment is
not strong enough to deter default. A number of studies have examined the extent
to which additional punishments can sustain lending.3 The most common penalty
is that a default results in interference with the international transactions of the
debtor; for example, the lender may impose trade sanctions or seize the debtor’s
foreign assets [e.g., Cohen and Sachs (1986) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989)]. These
penalties have two major disadvantages. First, the size of the penalty is exogenous
and therefore does not depend on the characteristics of debtors or creditors. Second,
the sovereignty status of countries limits the extent to which countries can be
“punished” for defaulting.
Given the limitations of direct punishments, an alternative solution is to reward
borrowers for good behavior—that is, if they repay the debt. This paper examines
the extent to which a particular type of reward, foreign aid, affects the incentive of
the recipient country to expropriate foreign investment. We consider a two-country
model in which a “rich” country lends to a “poor” country. In addition, the rich
country can provide aid to the poor country. If the poor country defaults on a loan,
it loses access to foreign capital and aid. By increasing the cost of default, aid
reduces default risk and promotes private foreign investment. Furthermore, we
show that it is possible for the donor country to benefit, along with the recipi-
ent country, from giving aid when enforcement of private contracts is imperfect.
Specifically, we show that it is at least weakly Pareto improving for a rich country
to provide foreign aid to a risky poor country with investment opportunities when
there is no supranational court that can compel repayment.4 The key insight is that,
when enforcement is problematic, foreign aid serves as an implicit enforcement
mechanism that benefits both the donor and the recipient country.5
In deriving our results, we use a model of imperfect enforcement in which the
foreign investment problem is reduced to a comparison of a country’s idiosyncratic
discount factor β and two critical thresholds, β and β∗ [cf., Asiedu and Villamil
(2000)]. These thresholds yield disjoint subintervals that correspond to three
possible equilibria: autarky, constrained, and unconstrained optimal investment.
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We focus on policy interventions that can alter the thresholds, thereby increasing
the likelihood that a country can access private capital markets. This approach
is closely related to recent work on self-enforcing contracts by Atkeson (1991),
Eaton (1993), Thomas and Worrall (1994), and Krasa and Villamil (2000).
Section 2 specifies the model and describes the equilibria without aid. Section 3
analyzes the impact of aid on capital flows and provides estimates of model para-
meters. Section 4 concludes.
2. BASIC MODEL AND EQUILIBRIA
Consider a world with an infinite time horizon and two countries, rich and poor, that
are distinguished by the size of their capital stocks and investment opportunities.
The poor country has capital stock, k pt = k p for all t , that is less than the optimal
amount. It neither invests abroad nor can its capital stock be augmented. The rich
country has an elastic capital stock krt = kr for all t . The rich country can invest
abroad at gross rate of return r or in a safe alternative storage technology with gross
return σ . There is no intrinsic difference between capital in the two countries, and
k p + kr is the world capital stock. See Smith and Villamil (1998) for a model with
differential access to alternative investment opportunities. Financial repression
can limit access to outside investment opportunities in developing countries [cf.,
Bencivenga and Smith (1992)].
Agents from both countries have a common risk-neutral utility function.6 The
key friction in the model is that the capital-poor country may choose not to repay
its debt: The government in the capital-poor country may prevent its citizens
from honoring foreign contractual obligations, for example, by blocking access
to foreign exchange or by reneging on loan guarantees. Then, if the rich country
lends to the poor country at gross return r , it may not be repaid. The alternative
storage technology to which only the rich country has access has a certain but
lower gross return σ , where r > σ > 0. Investors in the rich country would like to
lend as much as possible to the poor country, but the level of investment may be
constrained by default risk.7
The poor country has a constant-returns-to-scale production function, F(·),
which requires two inputs, labor and capital. Let f (·) denote output per capita,
which satisfies the Inada conditions. The domestic capital stock is less than the
optimal capital stock; thus, f ′(k p) > r . Let kt be the total amount of capital used
by the poor country for production in period t . Each period t , the poor country
borrows (kt − k p) from abroad and combines it with domestic capital k p for pro-
duction. Assume that the rich country’s capital stock exceeds the optimal amount
of capital needed for production; thus, f ′(kr ) < r .8 At the end of the period, the
country chooses whether to9
• repay its debt, r(kt − k p): Consume yt = f (kt ) − r(kt − k p), and borrow
again the next period; or
• default: Consume f (kt ), and receive no foreign capital henceforth (i.e.,
ks = k p, for s > t).
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with 0 < β < 1 and U p = yt = f (kt ) − r(kt − k p). As is standard [cf., Yaari (1965)],
β is the discount factor withβ = θρ. Parameter θ denotes the probability of survival,
an idiosyncratic factor that reflects the “patience” of decisionmakers in the poor
country, and ρ = 1/r is the common pure discount factor. As θ falls, the “country-
specific” β falls, indicating that the country becomes more myopic.10 The rich
country’s utility in period t is Ur (kt ) = r(kt − k p) + σ [kr − (kt − k p)]. The first
term is the gross return on capital lent to the poor country and the second term is
the gross return on capital put in storage.
Whether the poor country will repay a loan is governed by an incentive con-
straint. The discounted present value from being “bad” and reneging on a loan in
period t and remaining autarkic thereafter is given by
B(kt ) = f (kt ) +
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t ys = f (k) + β
1 − β f (k
p).
The discounted present value of being “good” and honoring a contract in period t






f (ks) − r
(
ks − k p
)] = 1
1 − β [ f (k) − r(k − k
p)].
As a consequence of stationarity, B(k) and G(k) are time invariant. The poor
country will repay the loan if
B(k) ≤ G(k), ∀ k. (1)
Whether a rich country with an outside option will lend to the poor country is
governed by a voluntary participation constraint. The rich country must receive at
least the return available from the storage technology. That is,
r
(
kt − k p
) + σ [kr − (kt − k p
)] ≥ σkr . (2)
Clearly, (2) is satisfied whenever r > σ , as assumed in the model.
The social planner’s problem is to choose a stationary level of aggregate in-
vestment k to maximize W (k) subject to repayment incentive constraint (1) and
participation constraint (2).
Problem 1. Choose k to maximize
W (k) = 1
1 − β [ f (k) − r(k − k
p)]
subject to (1) and (2).
Note that (2) does not bind. In a similar model without an outside option, Asiedu
and Villamil (2000) show that, when (1) holds, contracts are self-enforcing, that is,
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honored voluntarily. Let λ be the LaGrange multiplier. The first-order conditions
are B(k) = G(k) and
f ′(k) − r = rλ(1 − β)
1 + λβ .
When enforcement is imperfect, the poor country’s specific characteristics k p
and β(θ, r ) determine, in conjunction with r , its ability to attract foreign invest-
ment. In contrast, when enforcement is perfect, r is sufficient to determine capital
flows, and the poor country receives the unconstrained optimal level of invest-
ment. As a consequence, the solutions to Problem 1 are described by one of three
cases. Let k∗u denote the optimal capital sequence when (1) does not bind (the un-
constrained optimal plan) and k∗c denote the plan when (1) binds (the constrained
optimal plan). Then:
Case 1. B(k) > G(k) for all k > k p: The constraint set is empty and no foreign
investment occurs.
Case 2. The constraint binds (i.e., λ > 0): f ′(k) > r and k = k∗c is the optimal
investment plan.
Case 3. The constraint does not bind (i.e., λ = 0): f ′(k) = r and k = k∗u is the
optimal investment plan.
As in Asiedu and Villamil (2000), the solutions to Problem 1 are characterized
by restrictions on the discount factor that segment the unit interval into three cases.
The equilibrium is determined by a comparison of β and the relevant case on the
unit interval. Define these two critical thresholds by
β∗: the minimum discount factor required to sustain k∗u , and
β: the minimum discount factor required to attract foreign investment.
Foreign investors effectively compare the poor country’s idiosyncratic β(θ, r) and
the relevant subinterval: Case 1 prevails when β ∈ (0, β); Case 2 prevails when
β ∈ [β, β∗]; and Case 3 prevails when β ∈ [β∗, 1].
The utilities of the two countries under the three cases are
Case 1: Ur = σkr , and U p = f (k p);
Case 2: Ur = r(k∗c − k p) + σ [kr − (k∗c − k p)], and U p = f (k∗c ) − r(k∗c − k p);
Case 3: Ur = r(k∗u − k p) + σ [kr − (k∗u − k p)], and U p = f (k∗u) − r(k∗u − k p).
For both countries the most preferred equilibrium is Case 3 and the least pre-
ferred is Case 1. Case 2 is a version of Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) time in-
consistency result: The constrained equilibrium is Pareto inferior relative to the
unconstrained equilibrium with full commitment. However, no “commitment tech-
nology” is available that can induce agents to adhere to the “first best” intertem-
poral plan expost. The inability of the poor country to commit to honor investment
agreements has an adverse impact on both. This provides an incentive for the two
countries to implement polices that will mitigate the enforcement problem. Asiedu
and Villamil (2000) study policy options available to the poor country. In the next
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section we discuss policies that the rich country or a third party can use to ame-
liorate the inefficiencies that result from inadequate contractual enforcement. The
class of policies that we consider affect the threshold discount factors, β and β∗,
but not the country-specific discount factor β(θ, r ). We show that, by reducing β
and β∗, foreign aid can, in principle, eliminate the autarky equilibrium and restore
equilibrium to the unconstrained level. Further, when the enforcement constraint
binds, an increase in aid raises k∗c .
3. EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
In this section we analyze the impact of foreign aid on capital flows and welfare. We
consider developmental finance, a type of foreign aid often provided by developed-
country governments and multilateral organizations. Development finance takes
two forms: loan subsidy and technical assistance. We examine how these programs
affect a country’s incentive to default. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.1. Policy 1: Loan Subsidy
Loan subsidies are an important source of finance for many developing countries.
For example, over 90% of foreign loans to Sub-Saharan Africa are subsidized.
These loans either carry below-market interest rates or take the form of grants
(i.e., funds for which there is no repayment requirement).11 We modify the model
so that, in addition to lending to the poor country, the rich country can provide aid
in the form of a loan subsidy. The penalty for default is that the poor country loses
access to foreign investment and aid. Since current output is consumed each period,
aid must be injected each period in order to have the desired effect. This is consistent
with the empirical results of Lensink and Morrissey (2000), which indicate that
aid has a positive impact on investment only if aid receipts are predictable.
Let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 be the fraction of capital provided by the rich country on a con-
cessional basis at gross interest rate τ . We assume that 0 ≤ τ < σ < r . Thus, τ = 0
indicates that the loan is a grant (i.e., no interest or principal repayment is required).
Similarly, τ = 1 indicates that the loan is interest free (only repayment of princi-
pal is required). Finally, 1 < τ < r indicates that the loan requires repayment of
principal and interest at a concessional rate. We assume that 0 ≤ τ < σ < r , which
reflects the fact that providing aid is costly to the donor country since the donor
would receive a higher return σ if it utilized the storage facility. However, if the
loan were repaid, the rich country would receive the highest return by investing
in the poor country at market rate r . Then, the amount of loans provided at inte-
rest rate τ is γ (k − k p). The remaining outside investment, (1 − γ )(k − k p), earns
gross return r . The utility from default, B(k), is unchanged. The utility from not
defaulting, G(k), is now given by
G(k) = 1
1 − β [ f (k) − r(1 − γ )(k − k
p) − τγ (k − k p)].
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To examine the impact of Policy 1 on the two countries, we solve two problems.
Problem 2 solves the poor country’s problem by choosing the level of investment,
k, that maximizes its utility for a given loan package, w = w(τ, γ ), while Problem 3
solves the rich country’s problem by specifying the level of aid that maximizes its
utility, given that k solves Problem 2.
Problem 2. For a given loan package, w = w(τ, γ ), choose k to maximize
W (k) = 1
1 − β [ f (k) − r(1 − γ )(k − k
p) − τγ (k − k p)]
subject to
B(k) ≤ G(k), ∀ k.
Similar to Problem 1, the equilibrium level of investment is described by three
cases. We next examine how Policy 1 affects the threshold discount factors, capital
flows, and the welfare of the poor country. We show that, by the appropriate choice
of policy, a loan subsidy program can eliminate the Case 1 and Case 2 equilibria.
Further, when the enforcement constraint binds, a loan subsidy raises utility and
foreign investment. Claim 1 summarizes the results.



























(iii) There exists a loan package w̄ = w(τ̄ , γ̄ ) that eliminates the autarky equilibrium.
(iv) There exists a loan package w∗ = w(τ ∗, γ ∗) that restores investment to its uncon-
strained level.
Discussion. Claim 1 indicates that a concessionary loan subsidy policy (i.e.,
Policy 1) weakens the incentive constraint and expands investment. The policy
tends to decrease the critical thresholds, β and β∗, which determine the lengths of
the intervals that correspond to the three equilibrium cases. When policy reduces
the critical thresholds, this shrinks the Case 1 and Case 2 equilibria, thereby ex-
panding the “best-case” unconstrained Case 3 equilibrium. Claim 1(i) indicates
that, when the donor increases the size of the loan package γ , this decreases β,
reducing the Case 1 interval. The effect of γ on β∗ is unclear,12 but Claim 1(ii)
shows that an increase in γ always leads to more investment in the constrained
case. Claim 1(ii) also shows that the utility of the poor country and foreign invest-
ment decrease with τ .13 Finally, Claims 1(iii) and 1(iv) indicate that, by lowering
the threshold discount factors to the point where the country-specific β exceeds
the threshold, Policy 1 can eliminate the undesirable Case 1 and Case 2 equilibria.
Numerical Example. Consider the case in which the loan takes the form of
a grant, that is, τ = 0. Table 1 shows that in the absence of aid the autarky
(Case 1) equilibrium prevails and no foreign investment occurs. This occurs be-
cause β = 0.62 <β = 0.699. An increase in γ to 0.3 lowers β and β∗ such that
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TABLE 1. Effect of a grant on the equilibriuma
γ = 0: No aid γ = 0.3 γ = 0.6
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
β 0.699 0.489 0.280
β∗ 0.845 0.728 0.598
k∗c − k p 0 0.061 0.207
y∗c 1.316 1.42 1.701
aParameters: r = 1.05, τ = 0, β = 0.62, k = 0.1002, and f (k) = k0.3.
β ∈ (β, β∗), and the constrained equilibrium (Case 2) prevails. When γ increases
to 0.6, β ∈ (β∗, 1) and the unconstrained equilibrium (Case 3) prevails. Thus,
loan package w̄ = w(0, 0.3) eliminates the autarky equilibrium and w∗ = w(0, 0.6)
eliminates the constrained equilibrium. Further, k∗c and y
∗
c increase with γ .
Claim 1 shows that a loan subsidy unambiguously benefits the poor country.
However, this program is costly to the rich country because the concessional inter-
est rate, τ , is less than the return on storage, σ . As a consequence, a nonaltruistic
rich country will provide a loan subsidy only if doing so is at least weakly Pareto im-
proving compared to the outcome without aid. This raises the following questions:
• Under what conditions will the rich country benefit (along with the poor
country) from giving a loan subsidy?
• What is the optimal loan package (i.e., how are γ and τ determined)?
To answer these questions we analyze the impact of Policy 1 on the welfare of
the rich country when the Case 1 and Case 2 equilibria occur. We first consider
the Case 1 equilibrium in which the poor country’s β is so low that no foreign
investment occurs. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a
loan subsidy yields a strict Pareto improvement for the rich country. The results are
summarized in Proposition 1. We next derive the optimal loan package in which
the Case 2 equilibrium prevails. The results are stated in Proposition 2.
The utility of the rich country is given by
Ur (γ, τ ) = r(1 − γ )(k − k p) + τγ (k − k p) + σ [kr − (k − k p)],
where k = k(γ, τ ) solves Problem 2. The first term is the rich country’s gross
return on nonsubsidized investment in the poor country; the second term is the
gross return on subsidized loans; the last term is the amount of capital that the
rich country invests in storage and earns gross return σ . In the Case 1 equilibrium,
k = k p, and in the Case 2 equilibrium, k satisfies G(k) = B(k).
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose the poor country’s discount factor is too low [i.e.,
β <β(r, k p)] and therefore the autarky equilibrium is attained. Then, a loan
package, ŵ = w(γ̂ , τ̂ ), yields a strict Pareto improvement relative to autarky for
the rich country if and only if ŵ satisfies the following conditions:
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(i) β ≥β(r, k p, ŵ) = [r(1 − γ̂ ) + τ̂ γ̂ ]/f ′(k p);
(ii) γ̂ (r − τ̂ ) < (r − σ).
Let w∗ = (γ ∗, τ ∗) be the optimal loan package that maximizes Ur (w). In deter-
mining w∗, we first assume an interior solution (i.e., γ > 0) and solve Problem 3,
and then compare the utility under aid with the utility without aid.
Problem 3. Choose γ > 0 and 0 ≤ τ < σ to maximize
Ur (τ, γ ) = r(1 − γ )(k∗c − k p
) + τγ (k∗c − k p
) + σ [kr − (k∗c − k p
)]
,
where k∗c = k∗c (τ, γ ) solves Problem 2.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose the poor country’s discount factor is moderate
{i.e., β ∈ [β, β∗)} and therefore the constrained equilibrium prevails. Then the
optimal loan package w∗ = (γ ∗, τ ∗) is unique and satisfies the rich country’s util-
ity Ur (w∗) = max{Ur (0), Ur (w̃)} where w̃ = (γ̃ , τ̃ ) solves Problem 3 and Ur (0)
is the utility with no aid.
Proposition 1 specifies necessary and sufficient conditions under which a loan
subsidy program is welfare enhancing when the autarky equilibrium prevails. Con-
dition (i) indicates that, in the autarky equilibrium, the rich country will invest in
the poor country only if it can provide enough aid such that the poor country’s β
achieves the lower threshold (i.e., β ≥β). The reason is that, when β <β, the gain
from expropriation exceeds the cost. As a consequence the poor country will ex-
propriate foreign investment. Condition (ii) ensures that aid yields a higher utility
than autarky. Proposition 2 indicates that when the repayment incentive constraint
binds, the optimal loan package yields at least weak Pareto improvements to the
rich country, compared to the outcome without aid.
3.2. Policy 2: Technical Assistance
Developed countries and multilateral agencies often provide free technical assis-
tance to developing countries in the form of technical cooperation grants.14 These
grants take two forms: freestanding grants, which are intended to finance the trans-
fer of technical and managerial skills for the purpose of building national capacity
without reference to any specific investment project; and investment-related tech-
nical assistance, which is provided to strengthen the capacity to execute specific
investment projects. Given the nature of technical assistance, it is reasonable to
assume that these services increase productivity and therefore result in higher out-
put. We modify our model to allow the rich country to provide technical assistance
to the poor country. Then, the penalty for default is twofold: The poor country
loses access to foreign investment and technical assistance.15
Let α be the amount of resources that the rich country spends on technical
assistance. Suppose that technical assistance causes the poor country’s output
to increase by δ(α).16 Assume δ′(α) > 0 and δ′′(α) < 0. Then, the utility from
defaulting, B(k), and the utility from not defaulting, G(k), are given by
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G(k) = 1
1 − β {[1 + δ(α)] f (k) − r(k − k
p)},
and
B(k) = [1 + δ(α)] f (k) + β
1 − β f (k
p).
Next, we analyze the impact of technical assistance on the threshold discount
factors, private capital flows, and the welfare of the two countries, and also discuss
how α is selected.
Claim 2. Technical assistance has the following effects:
(i) It eliminates the autarky equilibrium.








and dβ∗/dα is unclear.
(iii) There exists some level of technical assistance, α̂, that will eliminate the constrained
equilibrium.
Claim 2(i) indicates that countries that receive technical assistance will receive
some foreign investment, although the level of investment may be constrained. This
implies that β = 0, suggesting that this type of policy may be especially useful
in countries with inadequate enforcement, that is, low-β countries. Claim 2(ii)
suggests that “constrained countries” that receive technical assistance will attract
more private foreign investment. Claim 2(iii) indicates that technical assistance
can move a country from the constrained to the unconstrained equilibrium.
We now derive the optimal level of technical assistance and the conditions
under which technical assistance yields Pareto improvements to the rich country.
The utility of the rich country under this policy is given by
Ur (α) = r(k∗c − k p
) + σ [kr − (k∗c − k p
) − α],
where k∗c = k∗c (α) solves the poor country’s problem. The first term in the utility
function is the gross return from investing abroad and the second term is the gross
return from using the storage facility after paying for technical assistance.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose the poor country’s discount factor is too low [i.e.,
β ∈ (0, β)] and therefore the autarky equilibrium is attained. Then technical as-
sistance, α, yields strict Pareto improvements to the rich country compared to the
case without aid if and only if α σ < (r − σ)(k∗c − k p).
Problem 4. Choose α > 0 to maximize the rich country’s utility:
Ur (α) = r(k∗c − k p
) + σ [kr − (k∗c − k p
) − α],
where k∗c = k∗c (α) solves the poor country’s problem.
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PROPOSITION 4. Suppose the poor country’s discount factor is moderate {i.e.,
β ∈ [β, β∗)} and therefore the constrained equilibrium prevails. Then the opti-
mal level of technical assistance, α∗, satisfies the rich country’s utility Ur (α∗) =
max{Ur (0), Ur (α̃)}, where α̃ solves Problem 4 and Ur (0) is the utility when no
aid is given.
Our analysis indicates that bilateral aid promotes foreign investment and unam-
biguously improves the welfare of the poor country. Further, the rich country can
choose the level of aid such that it provides at least weak Pareto improvements
compared to the case without aid. Why should multilateral assistance exist in a
world in which governments have their own bilateral aid programs? Next, we make
a case for multilateral assistance.
3.3. Multilateral Assistance
Our analysis indicates that the threat of losing access to bilateral aid in the event
of default increases the penalty of default and, as a result, decreases default risk.
This suggests that a lender may provide aid to a borrower as a means of protecting
the lender’s investment. However, uncoordinated bilateral aid has two important
problems relative to multilateral aid. First, a “threshold problem” is inherent in
the foreign aid equilibrium. That is, if a single lender cannot provide sufficient
assistance to decrease β to the point where β ≥β, it is preferable for the lender
to provide no funds. This problem corresponds exactly to the “minimum finance
constraint” in the Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) type of delegated mon-
itoring models in which more than one investor is required to finance a project.
In our model, if β is very low, several investors may be necessary to provide
sufficient funds to avoid the autarky equilibrium because the required aid may ex-
ceed a single rich country’s resources. If this occurs, both countries will be stuck
in the “bad” equilibrium. In contrast, by pooling resources a multilateral agency
will have a bigger aid base to distribute and can coordinate aid more effectively
among poor countries.17 Second, lack of coordination may provide an opportunity
for selective default—a poor country may default on loans from one country and
continue borrowing from other countries. If the motivation for providing aid is to
reduce default risk, then it is more efficient for all countries to band together and
form a coalition, that is, a multilateral agency. By coordinating official flows from
multiple sources, the multilateral agency solves the threshold and selective default
problems, and is able to take advantage of economies of scale and scope.
Finally, recall that foreign aid unambiguously improves the welfare of the poor
country. Further, recall that bilateral aid is not motivated by altruism in our model—
the rich country provides aid only if doing so increases its utility.18 As we show in
Propositions 1 and 3, this limits the amount of aid disbursed by the rich country.
If an altruistic motive to alleviate poverty is also present, this will result in an
increase in aid and thereby further enhance the poor country’s welfare.19 Indeed,
compared to multilateral loans, bilateral loans typically have higher interest rates
and shorter repayment periods. Furthermore, bilateral assistance often take the
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form of tied credit—where the recipient country is required to use a specified
amount of the loan to purchase goods and services manufactured by the donor
country. The motivation for tied aid is to assist producers in the donor country and
to reduce the net capital outflow generated by aid programs.
3.4. Measures of Model Parameters
Table 2 presents measures of key parameters in the model for selected poor coun-
tries. We use the interest-rate spread defined by the lending rate in the poor country
minus LIBOR as a measure of (r − σ ); the ratio of technical assistance to GNP
TABLE 2. Model parameters for selected countries
Lending % of
rate minus % Technical Loansa at Subsidized Interest
Discount LIBOR assistance/ subsidized interest on private
Country factor β r − σ GNP, δ rate γ rate τ loans r
Argentina 0.62 6.1 0.06 43 6.99 7.99
Bangladesh 0.36 8.6 NA 95 1.16 3.78
Brazil 0.67 NA 0.05 40 6.99 8.48
Burkina Faso 0.47 NA 5.11 100 1.27 NA
Cameroon 0.55 14.4 1.3 93 4.29 7.83
Chile 0.65 12.8 0.11 68 6.13 7.00
China 0.66 4.1 0.09 33 5.44 7.03
Colombia 0.57 34.8 NA 39 7.03 7.98
Congo 0.42 14.4 1.22 100 5.36 NA
Ghana 0.59 NA 1.49 81 1.73 7.20
Haiti 0.23 16.6 3.01 100 1.42 NA
India 0.58 9.2 0.14 67 3.88 7.14
Indonesia 0.62 16.4 NA 69 5.29 6.76
Malaysia 0.61 3.3 0.20 21 5.47 7.00
Mexico 0.67 28.3 0.03 37 7.58 7.34
Niger 0.43 NA 5.08 82 1.64 12.20
Nigeria 0.47 14.8 0.35 82 5.58 7.78
Peru 0.49 28 0.36 97 6.16 6.85
Philippines 0.46 10 0.57 64 5.08 6.53
Russia NA NA NA 72 6.46 7.44
Sierra Leone 0.32 NA 3.56 98 1.26 7.95
Swaziland NA 13 2.97 100 4.83 NA
Togo 0.43 NA NA 100 0.90 NA
Zambia 0.42 NA 4.38 89 1.84 8.38
Source: World Bank (2000). Data are averaged from 1988–1998.
aSubsidized loans are loans from developed-country governments, the World Bank, Regional Development Banks
(African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank) and other multila-
teral agencies. These loans take the form of grants (i.e., have no repayment requirement) or carry below-market rates.
Private loans include loans from commercial banks and other private creditors. The data indicate that subsidized
loans are an important source of finance for low-β countries.
488 ELIZABETH ASIEDU AND ANNE P. VILLAMIL
measures the level of output lost when technical assistance is withdrawn, δ; the
interest rate on private (i.e., nonsubsidized) foreign loans is r ; γ and τ are the ratio
of subsidized loans to total loans and the subsidized interest rates, respectively. The
discount factor, β = θ/r , where θ measures country risk, is given by the average
of five indicators: corruption, contract repudiation, expropriation risk, rule of law,
and bureaucratic quality.20
Discussion. Our model shows that foreign aid reduces default risk, stimulates
foreign investment, and can improve the welfare of both the donor and the recipient
country. Further, it may be more efficient to have one organization—a multilateral
agency—coordinate aid disbursement. In this sense, multilateral agencies serve
as an enforcement mechanism in an international setting, thereby providing a
rationale for the existence of such organizations. The relationship between default
risk and aid has already been established in the empirical literature [cf., Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), Burton and Inoue (1987), Nunnekamp and Picht (1989),
Collier and Dollar (1998), Dollar and Easterly (1998)]. For example, using data
for 53 developing countries, Nunnekamp and Picht (1989) conclude that countries
that received more subsidized loans were less likely to engage in willful default.
Our model has the following implications for policy:
First, low-β countries should receive more aid.21 For example, the correlation
between β and aid policy variables for the selected poor countries in Table 2
are Corr(β, δ) = −0.7; Corr(β, γ ) = −0.8, and Corr(β, τ) = 0.7. The high corre-
lation stems from the fact that default risk is higher for low-β countries and, as
a consequence, such countries are more likely to be in the autarky or constrained
equilibrium. At a glance, this policy seems problematic because it suggests that
the multilateral agency rewards countries with inefficient institutions (i.e., low-β
countries), thereby creating moral hazard—that is, no incentive for countries to
improve their institutions. Note, however, that a country’s welfare also depends on
β. Thus, a country must improve its institutions in order to reap the full benefits
of aid. This explanation is consistent with the empirical results of Burnside and
Dollar (2000), who find that aid induces growth only in countries with good institu-
tions (i.e., high-β countries). Thus, our model provides a plausible explanation for
why a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have not experienced significant
growth, in spite of obtaining large amounts of aid.22 Indeed, the inability of aid to
stimulate growth is one of the main criticisms of multilateral agencies such as the
World Bank.
A second implication of our model is that, for low-β countries, developmental
lending is effective (i.e., reduces default risk and stimulates private foreign invest-
ment) only if it is big enough to lower β to the point where β ≥β. Otherwise,
the country will expropriate foreign investment. A number of countries have, in
the past, refused to repay foreign loans. For example, in 1972 the new military
government of Ghana repudiated all foreign debts, including loans from the IMF
and the World Bank. This suggests that a multilateral agency must be selective
in its lending and cognizant of a “default trap” problem. Indeed, the World Bank
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sometimes ceases lending to highly politically unstable countries (e.g., the World
Bank until recently had suspended lending to Liberia and Sierra Leone).
Third, the country-specific discount factor, β, affects a country’s incentive to
expropriate foreign investment. As shown in Table 2, β varies widely across coun-
tries. This suggests that, in designing policies, multilateral agencies should take
into consideration “country-specific” characteristics, especially the institutional
framework of the country. Indeed, a major criticism of multilateral agencies such
as the World Bank is that they often utilize a “one size fits all” policy for developing
countries.
Finally, our model suggests that multilateral assistance may have some inherent
advantages relative to bilateral assistance. Note that, in recent years, there has been
a shift from bilateral lending to multilateral lending. Multilateral lending increased
from an average of $6 billion over the period 1988–1993 to $7 billion over the
period 1994–1999. Bilateral lending declined from $8.8 billion to $3.8 billion over
the same period. Further, since 1994, multilateral lending has surpassed bilateral
lending.
We end our discussion by comparing the merits of the two developmental as-
sistance programs. Technical assistance and loan subsidies differ in two important
respects: (i) technical assistance is free to the recipient and (ii) technical assistance
directly affects productivity. This suggests that technical assistance may be a bet-
ter policy. Recent trends in developmental assistance indicate a shift from lending
to the provision of technical assistance. For example, the share of developmental
finance spent on technical assistance increased from 47% over the period 1988–
1991 to 60% over the period 1992–1998.23 According to our model, this policy
shift will enhance investment flows.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that when the enforcement of private contracts is limited by
private creditors’ ability to impose direct negative sanctions, a positive flow of
foreign aid that is costly to the donor may be welfare improving for both the
recipient and the donor. Such policies weaken the incentive constraint, thereby
creating the potential for Pareto improvements. Key features of the model are that
the poor country has a limited capital stock, k p, attractive investment opportunities,
and nontrivial default risk. By offering foreign aid, the rich country changes the
poor country’s payoff from default, which is directly beneficial to both countries.
If the capital-poor country were to take measures to augment its own capital stock,
this would reduce the donor’s ability to exercise control. These trade-offs provide
fertile grounds for future work.
NOTES
1. Bilateral loans are loans from developed-country governments and multilateral loans include
loans from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and Regional Development Banks (e.g.,
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African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank). Developmental lending has generally been
falling over time, decreasing from about $51 billion in 1991 to $35 billion in 1997 [cf., World Bank
(2000)].
2. We define expropriation as the violation of any condition of an investment agreement: government
default on foreign investment contracts or guarantees, preventing residents from honoring obligations
to foreign creditors, etc.
3. See Kletzer (1994) and Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for discussions of various penalties.
4. This implication of our model is consistent with the evidence gathered by Maizel and Nissanke
(1984) and Alesina and Dollar (1998).
5. Developing-country governments often use the “donor-enriching” argument as a basis to request
aid. For example, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria recently remarked that “it is not because we
want charity, but because we believe that it is in our creditors’ strategic interests to have debt remission”
[cf., Financial Times, Sept. 15, 2000].
6. We focus on risk neutrality to study the effect of “pure enforcement problems” on investment.
Underinvestment is even more severe if international capital markets are used to insure consumption
by risk-averse agents.
7. One can interpret (r − σ ) as the spread between the return on private investment in the poor
country and LIBOR. Measures of (r − σ ) and r are provided in Section 3.
8. This implies that, in the absence of default risk, the poor country can borrow the optimal amount
from the rich country. Cline (1995) notes that there is no shortage of capital: The stock of financial
assets in industrial countries is about $20 trillion, but the capital flows to developing countries are about
$120 billion.
9. The proceeds from investment are consumed in the current period and debt matures each period.
There is no capital accumulation. If capital accumulation occurred and the domestic stock reached the
optimal level at some period t , the poor country’s incentive problem would change. The country would
lose nothing by being denied a loan in period t + 1 and therefore would refuse to repay loans taken in
period t . Rational investors realize this and, as a result, no lending occurs in period t . By backward
induction, no lending occurs at all.
10. Modeling the discount factor as a function of country-specific risk, θ , allows us to analyze the
impact of θ on sovereign default decisions and capital flows. We provide measures of β for selected
countries in Table 2.
11. For example, loans issued by the International Development Agency, an affiliate of the World
Bank carry a 35- to 40-year maturity, are interest free, and carry a service charge of only 0.75%.
12. When dβ∗/dγ < 0, an increase in γ lengthens the Case 3 interval, increasing the likelihood
that the poor country will sustain the unconstrained optimal level of investment. When dβ∗/dγ > 0, an
increase in γ shrinks the Case 3 interval, a result that may seem problematic but is not. Recall that β∗
determines the equilibrium attained (constrained or unconstrained), not the level of investment. When
the enforcement constraint binds, and this is the situation in which we are interested, then β < β∗. As
a consequence, “constrained countries” remain constrained even if β∗ increases. Hence, an increase
in β∗ does not change the equilibrium attained when (2) binds, but a loan subsidy is still desirable
because it increases the level of investment k∗c .
13. A number of economists and policymakers have recently argued that multilateral loans should
carry higher interest rates. For example, in August 2000, the G8 recommended that the IMF increase
the interest rate that it charges on its loans. The rationale behind this proposal is to discourage perpetual
borrowing from the IMF. However, our analysis suggests that this policy will depress investment flows.
14. For example, in 1999, about $16 billion (40% of developmental finance) was spent on Technical
Assistance to developing countries [cf., World Bank (2000)].
15. Haque and Khan (1997) model technical assistance as expatriate skills that contribute to pro-
ductivity. See Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) for a model in which a country loses foreign managerial
skills when it expropriates foreign capital.
16. This implies that the withdrawal of technical assistance leads to an efficiency loss in production
and causes output to decline by δ. We provide estimates of δ in Table 2.
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17. In addition, if monitoring is necessary, then a multilateral agency would also eliminate duplica-
tive monitoring as is standard in delegated monitoring models.
18. The empirical studies of Schraeder et al. (1998) and Rodrik (1995) indicate that bilateral loans
are not motivated by the desire to meet the economic needs of the recipient country.
19. Our argument contrasts with that of Svensson (2000) who asserts that delegating aid disburse-
ment to an agency with less aversion to poverty will improve the welfare of the poor in the recipient
country.
20. See Asiedu and Villamil (2000) for a detailed description of the risk indicators and Mauro
(1995).
21. This implication of our model is consistent with the empirical findings of Collier and Dollar
(1999).
22. For example, in 1998, foreign aid as a share of GNP for Sub-Saharan Africa was 4%. This
compares with 0.2% for Latin America and 0.3% for East Asia [cf., World Bank (2000)].
23. This implies that the share of developmental finance spent on loan subsidies decreased from
53% to 40% over the same period.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Claim 1, Parts (i) and (ii). Under loan subsidy, B(k) and G(k) are given by
G(k) = 1
1 − β [ f (k) − r(1 − γ )(k − k
p) − τγ (k − k p)]
and
B(k) = f (k) + β
1 − β f (k
p).
In the autarky equilibrium, B(k) cuts G(k) at k p from below. This implies that B ′(k p) <
G ′(k p) and β f ′(k p) < r(1 − γ ) + γ τ . Thus, the smallest discount factor required to attract
foreign investment, β, is given by
β(k p, r, γ, τ ) = r(1 − γ ) + γ τ
f ′(k p)
. (A.1)
Further, k∗u is self-enforcing if and only if B(k
∗
u) ≤ G(k∗u). This implies that k∗u is self-
enforcing if and only if β ≥ β∗, where β∗ is defined by
β∗(r, k p, γ, τ ) = [r(1 − γ ) + τγ ]
(





) − f (k p) . (A.2)
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(A.4)
Differentiating (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) with respect to γ and τ yields
dβ
dγ
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) − f (k p)]dβ
∗
dτ
= −{β∗ f ′(k∗u











) − f (k p)]dβ
∗
dγ
= −{β∗ f ′(k∗u




− (r − τ)(k∗u − k p
)
.
Note that B(k) cuts G(k) at k∗c from below and therefore {β f ′(k∗c ) − [r(1 − γ ) +
τγ ]} < 0. Further, since dk∗c /dτ < 0, the sign of the right-hand side of (A.6) is unclear.
A similar analysis holds for dβ∗/dγ .
Proof of Claim 1, Parts (iii) and (iv). Recall that a country is in the autarky equilib-
rium if β ∈ (0,β) and the constrained equilibrium if β ∈ (β, β∗). Therefore, a loan package
w̄ = w(τ̄ , γ̄ ) that lowers β to a point where β =β(r, k p, w̄) = [r(1 − γ̄ ) + τ̄ γ̄ ]/ f ′(k p) will
eliminate the autarky equilibrium. Similarly, a loan package w∗ = w(τ ∗, γ ∗) that lowers β∗
to a point where β = β∗(r, k p, w∗) will move the equilibrium from constrained to uncon-
strained.
Proof of Proposition 1. For lending to occur, β ≥β; otherwise the poor country will
default. Therefore, the loan package ŵ = w(γ̂ , τ̂ ) should lower β to the point where
β ≥β(r, k p, ŵ) = [r(1 − γ̂ ) + τ̂ γ̂ ]/ f ′(k p), thereby eliminating the incentive to default [see
the proof of Claim 1(i) for the derivation of β]. To prove Part (ii), note that Ur (w) =
[(r − σ) − γ (r − τ)](k∗c − k p) + ūr , where ūr is the utility under autarky. The result fol-
lows from the fact that Ur (ŵ) > ūr if and only if (r − σ) > γ̂ (r − τ̂ ).
Solution to Problem 3. The first-order conditions are given by




− (r − τ)(k∗c − k p
) = 0, (A.7)




+ γ (k∗c − k p
) + λ = 0, (A.8)
τλ = 0,
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where k∗c = k∗c (τ, γ ) satisfies B(k∗c ) = G(k∗c ) and λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Substituting
(A.5) in (A.7) and (A.8) yields λ = 0. This implies that γ̃ and τ̃ are uniquely determined
by (A.7) and (A.8).
Proof of Claim 2, Part (i). Under technical assistance, G(k) and B(k) are given by
G(k) = 1
1 − β {[1 + δ(α)] f (k) − r(k − k
p)}
and
B(k) = [1 + δ(α)] f (k) + β
1 − β f (k
p).
Note that B(k p) < G(k p). Hence there exists a k̄ > k p such that B(k) < G(k) for k ∈ (k p, k̄).
This implies that, for k ∈ (k p, k̄), no expropriation occurs and therefore some level of foreign
investment, (k̄ − k p), is sustainable.
Proof of Claim 2, Part (ii). Under technical assistance policy, an investment plan, k, is
self-enforcing if and only if B(k) ≤ G(k). Thus, k is self-enforcing if
0 <
r(k − k p)
[1 + δ(α)] f (k) − f (k p) ≤ β < 1.
Substitute k = k∗u . Then, k∗u is self-enforcing if and only if β ≥ β∗, where β∗ is defined by
β∗ = r
[
k∗u − k p
]
[1 + δ(α)] f (k∗u
) − f (k p) (A.9)
When the incentive constraint binds, k∗c satisfies
β
{
[1 + δ(α)] f (k∗c
) − f (k p)} − r(k∗c − k p






[1 + δ(α)] f (k∗c
) − r(k∗c − k p
)}
. (A.11)
Differentiating (A.9), (A.10), and (A.11) with respect to α yields
dk∗c
dα





β[1 + δ(α)] f ′(k∗c














[1 + δ(α)] f (k∗u
)− f (k p)}dβ
∗
dα









When the enforcement constraint binds, B(k) cuts G(k) at k∗c from below and there-
fore [β(1 + δ) f ′(k∗c ) − r ] < 0. The sign of the right-hand side of (A.12) is unclear since
dk∗u/dα > 0 and δ
′(α) > 0.
Proof of Claim 2, Part (iii). Choose α̂ such that β = β∗(r, k p, α̂).
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Proof of Proposition 3. The utility of the rich country under technical assistance is
Ur (α) = [(r − σ)(k∗c − k p
) − σα] + ūr .
The result follows from the fact that Ur (α)> ūr if and only if ασ < (r − σ)(k∗c − k p).





− σ = 0,
where k∗c = k∗c (α) and B(k∗c ) = G(k∗c ).
